Methodological workshop

Frequentist and Bayesian approaches to improving your statistical inferences

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The Neyman-Pearson paradigm (N-H)

- In the Null Hypothesis (N-H) approach, the probability distributions are grouped into two aggregates:
 - H_0 : the null hypothesis
 - H_A : the alternative hypothesis

(there are several common variations on this notation; the alternative hypothesis, for example, is sometimes denoted as H_1 or even K.)

• The alternative hypothesis H_A is the **logical negation** of the null hypothesis H_0 , and *vice versa*.







The N-H table





Probabilistic interpretation

- Type I error α : $P(\text{reject } H_0|H_0 \text{ is true})$
- Type II error β : $P(\text{retain } H_0|H_0 \text{ is false})$
- Power 1β : $P(\text{reject } H_0 | H_0 \text{ is false}) = 1 P(\text{retain } H_0 | H_0 \text{ is false})$
- 1α : $P(\text{retain } H_0 | H_0 \text{ is true}) = 1 P(\text{reject } H_0 | H_0 \text{ is true})$

Note: these are conditional probabilities!! The *p*-value is

 $P(T \text{ at least as extreme as } v^*|H_0 \text{ is true})$

with v^* being the value of the observed statistic $T(\mathbf{x})$.



Graphical interpretation



Figure 3: Type I error and type II error for a t statistic.

Note that in an ideal situation the test T would have $\alpha = \beta = 0$, but this is not feasible in practice. For real data, it is always the case that, for a fixed sample size N, in order to decrease α , the probability β must be increased, and vice versa.





Decision rules (one tailed)

• **Decision rule** Ψ (based on the critical value and the observed statistic):

$$\Psi(v_c, v^*) = \begin{cases} \text{ retain } H_0 & \text{if } v^* \le v_c \\ \text{ reject } H_0 & \text{if } v^* > v_c \end{cases}$$
(1)

• **Decision rule** Φ (based on α and the *p*-value):

$$\Phi(\alpha, p-value) = \begin{cases} \text{ retain } H_0 & \text{if } p-value \ge \alpha \\ \text{ reject } H_0 & \text{if } p-value < \alpha \end{cases}$$
(2)



Connection between $\Psi \in \Phi$ (one tailed)







Replicability problem

There is increasing concern that most current published research findings are suffering from high rate of nonreplication (lack of confirmation) of their results.

According to some researchers, this is a consequence of applying standard statistical paradigms to derive research findings (adoption of formal statistical significance, e.g., p-value less than 0.05).

empirical researches plagued by false positive findings





Essay

Replicability problem

J. P.A. Ioannidis (2005). Plos Medicine, 8, 696-701

Open access, freely available online

Why Most Published Research Findings Are False

John P. A. Ioannidis

Summary

There is increasing concern that most current published research findings are false. The probability that a research claim is true may depend on study power and bias, the number of other studies on the same question, and, importantly, the ratio of true to no relationships among the relationships probed in each scientific field. In this framework, a research finding is less likely to be true when the studies conducted in a field are smaller; when

UNIVERSITĂ DEGLI STUDI DI TRENTO factors that influence this problem and some corollaries thereof.

Modeling the Framework for False Positive Findings

Several methodologists have pointed out [9–11] that the high rate of nonreplication (lack of confirmation) of research discoveries is a consequence of the convenient, yet ill-founded strategy of claiming conclusive research findings solely on the basis of a single study assessed by is characteristic of the field and can vary a lot depending on whether the field targets highly likely relationships or searches for only one or a few true relationships among thousands and millions of hypotheses that may be postulated. Let us also consider, for computational simplicity, circumscribed fields where either there is only one true relationship (among many that can be hypothesized) or the power is similar to find any of the several existing true relationships. The presented were highly and any of the several existing true relationships.



Replicability problem

According to Ioannidis (2005)

"high rate of nonreplication (lack of confirmation) of research discoveries is a consequence of the convenient, yet ill-founded strategy of claiming conclusive research findings solely on the basis of a single study assessed by formal statistical significance, typically for a p-value less than 0.05" (p. 696).

See the special issue

Perspective in Psychological Science, 2014, Vol 9(1)





Replicability problem

The basic problem is that we are usually interested in the posterior conditional probability

$$P(H_A|\text{reject } H_0) \equiv P(H_0 \text{ is false}|\text{reject } H_0)$$

Alternative hypothesis is true





This posterior probability represents the positive predictive value (PPV) of a true finding. That is to say

 $PPV = P(H_A | \text{reject } H_0).$

Note the difference:

- Type I error α : $P(\text{reject } H_0|H_0 \text{ is true})$
- Type II error β : $P(\text{retain } H_0|H_0 \text{ is false})$
- Power 1β : $P(\text{reject } H_0 | H_0 \text{ is false}) = 1 P(\text{retain } H_0 | H_0 \text{ is false})$
- 1α : $P(\text{retain } H_0 | H_0 \text{ is true}) = 1 P(\text{reject } H_0 | H_0 \text{ is true})$





$P(H_A | \text{reject } H_0) = \frac{P(H_A)P(\text{reject } H_0 | H_A)}{P(H_A)P(\text{reject } H_0 | H_A) + P(H_0)P(\text{reject } H_0 | H_0)}$





$$P(H_A|\text{reject } H_0) = \frac{P(H_A)P(\text{reject } H_0|H_A)}{P(H_A)P(\text{reject } H_0|H_A) + P(H_0)P(\text{reject } H_0|H_0)}$$
$$= \frac{P(H_A)(1-\beta)}{P(H_A)(1-\beta) + P(H_0)\alpha}$$





prior probability of the alternative hypothesis $P(H_A)$

$$P(H_A | \text{reject } H_0) = \frac{P(H_A)P(\text{reject } H_0 | H_A)}{P(H_A)P(\text{reject } H_0 | H_A) + P(H_0)P(\text{reject } H_0 | H_0)}$$
$$= \frac{P(H_A)(1 - \beta)}{P(H_A)(1 - \beta) + P(H_0)\alpha} = PPV$$

prior probability of the null hypothesis $P(H_0)$





By using a similar representation we can also derive the **<u>negative</u>** predictive value $P(H_0|$ reject $H_0)$:

$$NPV = 1 - PPV$$











Ioannidis reported some procedures to compute the prior probability H₀ on the basis of prior information, empirically based meta-analytic information, case scenario analysis, and expecially the so called potential bias

J. P.A. Ioannidis (2005). Plos Medicine, 8, 696-701





According to loannidis (2005), a **bias** is the combination of various design, data, analysis, and presentation factors that tend to produce research findings when *they should not be produced*.



Let $u \in [0,1]$ be the proportion of probed analyses that would not have been research findings (negative results), but nevertheless end up presented and reported as positive ones, because of bias.





The six corollaries

- **Corollary 1:** "The smaller the studies conducted in a scientific field, the less likely the research findings are to be true."
- **Corollary 2:** "The smaller the effect sizes in a scientific field, the less likely the research findings are to be true."
- **Corollary 3:** "The greater the number and the lesser the selection of tested relationships in a scientific field, the less likely the research findings are to be true."





The six corollaries

- **Corollary 4:** "The greater the flexibility in designs, definitions, outcomes, and analytical modes in a scientific field, the less likely the research findings are to be true."
- Corollary 5*: "The greater the financial and other interests and prejudices in a scientific field, the less likely the research findings are to be true."
- **Corollary 6*:** "The hotter a scientific field (with more scientific teams involved), the less likely the research findings are to be true."











Power analysis is based on four different parameters:







Effect size parameter defining H_A; it represents the degree of deviation from H₀ in the underlying population



Effect size (population level)





Post hoc power analysis



Post hoc power analyses (Cohen, 1988) often make sense after a study has already been conducted. It thus becomes possible to assess whether or not a published statistical test in fact had a fair chance of rejecting an incorrect null hypothesis. Importantly, post hoc analyses, like a priori analyses, require an H_A effect size specification for the underlying population. It should not be confused with *retrospective power analysis*.





Post hoc power analysis: an example using the pwr package

One-sample t-test: H0 $\mu \leq 0$



R output



John M. HOENIG and Dennis M. HEISEY The Abuse of Power: The Pervasive Fallacy of Power Calculations for Data Analysis

The American Statistician, February 2001, Vol. 55, No. 1

The power fallacy

It is well known that statistical power calculations can be valuable in planning an experiment. There is also a large literature advocating that power calculations be made whenever one performs a statistical test of a hypothesis and one obtains a statistically nonsignificant result. Advocates of such post-experiment power calculations claim the calculations should be used to aid in the interpretation of the experimental results. This approach, which appears in various forms, is fundamentally flawed. We document that the problem is extensive and present arguments to demonstrate the flaw in the logic.





Observed power analysis

The basic idea of observed power analysis is that there is evidence for the null hypothesis being true if $p > \alpha$ and the computed power is high at the observed effect size d







Observed power analysis







Observed power analysis



It is estimated from the sample according to the theoretical model for the null hypothesis





Observed power analysis



the theoretical model for the null hypothesis

It is biased!!!



April 21, 2015



Observed power analysis – hypothetical derivations







Observed power analysis – hypothetical derivations


















Problems with the null hypothesis (N-H) testing approach

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Problems with the null hypothesis (N-H) testing approach

relationship between observed power and p-value – simulation study



p-value





Problems with the null hypothesis (N-H) testing approach

One-sample t-test: H0 $\mu_1 = 0$ (simulation study)

```
n <- 50
mu0 <- 0
sd <- 1
B <- 2000
simPv <- rep(0,B)
for (b in 1:B) {
    X <- rnorm(n,mu0,sd)
    dobs <- (mean(X))/sqrt(((n-1)*sd^2)/(n-1))
    simPv[b] <- t.test(X)$p.value
    simPw[b] <- pwr.t.test(d=dobs,n=n,sig.level=0.05,power=NULL,
    type="one.sample",alternative="two.sided")$power
}
plot(simPv,simPw,ylab="Observed power", xlab="p-value")
```

R syntax





One of the main problems of standard power analysis is that it puts a narrow emphasis on statistical significance which is the primary focus of many study designs. However, in noisy, small-sample settings, statistically significant results can often be misleading. This is particularly true when observed power analysis is used to evaluate the statistical results.





A better approach would be



Design Analysis (DA): a set of statistical calculations about what could happen under hypothetical replications of a study (that focuses on estimates and uncertainties rather than on statistical significance)





Beyond Power Calculations: Assessing Type S (Sign) and Type M (Magnitude) Errors

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PSYCHOLOGICAL SCIENCE



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Somehow this work represents a kind of conceptual «bridge» linking the Frequentist approach with a more Bayesian oriented perspective



DA main tokens

- $d \in \mathbb{R}$ The observed effect
- $D \in \mathbb{R}$ The true population effect
 - $s \in \mathbb{R}^+$ The standard error (SE) of the observed effect
- lpha=0.05 The Type I error

 $d^{rep} \sim N(D,s)$ A hypothetical normally distributed random variable with parameters D and s (note this constitutes a conceptual leap)



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DA main tokens

The main goals are to compute:

1. The *power*: the probability that the replication *d*^{rep} is larger (in absolute value) than the critical value that is considered to define "statistical significance" in this analysis.

Power
$$\equiv Pr(|d^{rep} > 1.96|) + Pr(|d^{rep} < 1.96|)$$

= $1 - \Phi(1.96 - D/s) + \Phi(-1.96 - D/s)$

 Φ_{-} being the cumulative standard normal distribution





DA main tokens

The main goals are to compute:

2. The *Type S error rate*: the probability that the replicated estimate has the incorrect sign, if it is statistically significantly different from zero.

Type S Error
$$\equiv \frac{\Phi(-1.96 - D/s)}{\{[1 - \Phi(1.96 - D/s)] + \Phi(-1.96 - D/s)\}}$$



DA main tokens

The main goals are to compute:

3. The *exaggeration ratio* (expected Type M error): the expectation of the absolute value of the estimate divided by the effect size, if statistically significantly different from zero.

Type M Error
$$\equiv \frac{\mathbb{E}[d_+^{\text{rep}}|d_+^{\text{rep}} > 1.96]}{D}$$

$$d_{+}^{\operatorname{rep}} = |d^{\operatorname{rep}}|$$



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Gelman & Carlin (2014), p. 644



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```
retrodesign <- function(A, s, alpha=.05, df=Inf, n.sims=10000){
    z <- qt(1-alpha/2, df)
    p.hi <- 1 - pt(z-A/s, df)
    p.lo <- pt(-z-A/s, df)
    power <- p.hi + p.lo
    typeS <- p.lo/power
    estimate <- A + s*rt(n.sims,df)
    significant <- abs(estimate) > s*z
    exaggeration <- mean(abs(estimate)[significant])/A
    return(list(power=power,typeS=typeS,exaggeration=exaggeration))</pre>
```

R function: Gelman & Carlin (2014), p. 644



}



A simple example: linear regression



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Beyond power calculations



R syntax





> retrodesign(1, 0.3697,	, df=38)	
\$power	Design Analysis	
[1] 0.7498592		
	D = 1	
\$typeS	$\mathcal{D} = 1$	
[1] 2.05452/e-05	True population effect	
Severation		

R syntax









<pre>> retrodesign(0.5, (\$power []]</pre>	df=38) Design Analysis
[1] 0.2536931 StypeS	D = 0.5
[1] 0.003356801	True population effect
\$exaggeration [1] 1.962419	

R syntax









One sample t-test, D(=mu)=0.5, s(=sigma)=0.9

5000 simulated samples with 20 observations each from a normal distribution with parameters μ = 0.5; s = 0.9

% of significant results (≠ 0) : 39.7 % of sample means > D(=µ) : 32.3

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Beyond power calculations



Gelman & Carlin (2014), p. 644



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Beyond power calculations



Gelman & Carlin (2014), p. 644



Practical implications:

Design Analysis strongly suggests <u>larger</u> <u>sample sizes</u> than those that are commonly used in psychology. In particular, if sample size is too small, in relation to the true effect size, then what appears to be a win (statistical significance) may really be a loss (in the form of a claim that does not replicate).

For a more formal presentation of the DA approach see Gelman A. & Tuerlinckx F. (2000). Type S error rates for classical and Bayesian single and multiple comparison procedures. *Computational Statistics*, 15, 373–390.





Pros and cons of the Bayes factor (BF)





Recall

Positive predictive value (PPV)

Negative predictive value (PPV)

 $PPV = P(H_A | \text{reject } H_0) \qquad NPV = 1 - PPV$

We need the Bayes theorem to derive these posterior probabilities for the contrasting hypotheses





Recall

Positive predictive value (PPV)

Negative predictive value (PPV)

 $PPV = P(H_A | reject H_0)$ NPV = 1 - PPV

We need the Bayes theorem to derive these posterior probabilities for the contrasting hypotheses

The same applies if we want to compute the posterior probabilities explicitely given the observed data







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In general it is assumed that $p(H_A) = p(H_0)$, then

$$\begin{array}{c} \textbf{Bayes Factor} \\ \textbf{(BF)} \end{array} \longrightarrow \quad \frac{p(H_0|\mathbf{X})}{p(H_A|\mathbf{X})} = \frac{p(\mathbf{X}|H_0)}{p(\mathbf{X}|H_A)} \end{array}$$

The analytic derivation of BF can be very difficult (see, for example, Kass & Raftery, 1995)



A possible way out is to approximate the BF by means of some function of the Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC)

$$BIC = -2\ln(L) + k\ln(n)$$





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The BF can be approximated according to the following equation

$$BF = \frac{p(\mathbf{X}|H_0)}{p(\mathbf{X}|H_A)} \approx e^{(\Delta BIC)/2}$$
Exponential function

where $\Delta BIC = BIC(H_A) - BIC(H_0)$



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The BF can be approximated according to the following equation

$$BF = \frac{p(\mathbf{X}|H_0)}{p(\mathbf{X}|H_A)} \approx e^{(\Delta BIC)/2}$$

Warning: This represents a very basic approximation only!

Please see, for example, Kass & Raftery (1995), Wagenmakers (2007), and Bollen, Ray, Zavisca, & Harden (2012) for more rigorous derivations.



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Finally, the posterior probability of H₀ is

$$p_{\text{BIC}}(H_0|\mathbf{X}) = \frac{\text{BF}}{\text{BF}+1}$$

consequently, the posterior probability of HA is

$$p_{\text{BIC}}(H_A|\mathbf{X}) = 1 - p_{\text{BIC}}(H_0|\mathbf{X})$$



Raftery (1995) suggests the following substantive interpretations for the posterior probability

$p_{\operatorname{BIC}}(H_A \mathbf{X})$	Evidence
.50—.75	weak
.75–.95	positive
.95–.99	strong
> .99	very strong



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Pros and cons of the Bayes factor



A simple example: linear regression



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Pros and cons of the Bayes factor



R syntax


Pros and cons of the Bayes factor

A simple example: linear regression with categorical predictor





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Pros and cons of the Bayes factor



Pros and cons of the Bayes factor

Different resources for computing BF according to other approaches (es. http://pcl.missouri.edu/bayesfactor)



Our goal is to provide a convenient set of web-based Bayes factor calculators. Currently, we have implemented calculators for:

- Paired or one-sample t-tests
- Grouped or two-sample t-tests
- Regression

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- Paired t-tests where the null is an equivalence region rather than a point
- Binomially Distributed Observation

News: Release of Bayes Factor Package

We have recently released the <u>BayesFactor</u> package for R. This package computes Bayes factors for t-tests (see <u>Rouder et al., 2009</u>, <u>Morey and Rouder, 2011</u>), regression (see, <u>Rouder and Morey, 2013</u>) and ANOVA (see <u>Rouder et al., 2012</u>). The package has manual pages, and we will be including vignettes for easy use shortly.

Perception and Cognition Laboratory, Department of Psychological Sciences, University of Missouri, Columbia, MO, 65211, USA



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The main problem of the BF

Let us consider the following graphical representation





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Pros and cons of the Bayes factor

```
> x < - c(1:16)
> y <- c(c(1,3,5,7,6,4,2,1),3*c(1,3,5,7,6,4,2,1))
> plot(x,y,type="b",lwd=2)
> x < - c(1:16)
> y <- c(c(1,3,5,7,6,4,2,1), 3*c(1,3,5,7), 10+c(6,4,2,1))
> plot(x,y,type="b",lwd=2)
> MA <- lm(y \sim x)
> M0 <- lm(v~1)
> abline(MA)
> abline(M0,lty=3)
> BICA = -2*logLik(MA)[[1]] + 3*log(16)
> BIC0 = -2*\log Lik(M0)[[1]] + 2*\log(16)
> DBIC <- BICA - BICO
> DBIC
[1] -9.079352
> BF <- exp(DBIC/2)
> BF
[1] 0.01067687
> pBIC0 <- BF/(BF+1)
> pBIC0
[1] 0.01056407
> pBICA <- 1 - pBICO
> pBICA
                                                            R syntax
[1] 0.9894359
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```

The BF cannot recognize that both the models are bad models (the problem of relative comparisons)





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Thank you for your attention!



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